Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (english only)
17.09.2007
Joint Statement of the Presidency
H.E. Ms. Ursula Plassnik, Federal Minister for European and International
Affairs of the Republic of Austria
H.E. Mr. Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Costa Rica
Monday, 17 September 2007
[Part 1 – H.E. Ms. Ursula Plassnik, Federal Minister for European and International Affairs of the Republic of Austria]
Mr. Director-General,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Colleagues,
I welcome you to this Conference on Facilitating the Entry Into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
As you well know, it is for the first time that two countries, Austria and Costa Rica, have accepted the responsibility of a shared Presidency for this Article XIV Conference. I am honoured that you have entrusted us with this special task.
This shared Presidency by two CTBT Member States representing two different geographic regions symbolizes the global support for the Treaty. It testifies that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as international security as such, are truly universal concerns, in which each and every member state of the United Nations is a stakeholder. It also highlights the necessity for world-wide cooperation, a partnership, in the fight against global threats.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
The Austrian Government has set itself the clear objective to develop Vienna into a centre of competence for human security - striving for every person to live in dignity, in freedom from want and in freedom from fear.
Organised crime and drugs smuggling, concerns about energy shortages and climate change, terrorism and the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation: In multifaceted ways, the international organisations in Vienna respond to today’s global challenges. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime assists states in their struggle against illicit drugs, crime and terrorism. OPEC addresses the global demand for energy - just last week OPEC member states here in Vienna decided to raise global oil production to prevent a crisis on the oil market this winter. UNIDO aims to improve living conditions of people around the world. And IAEA and CTBT strive to counter the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. All these organisations have one common goal: to make this world a safer place for each and every human being.
Striving to use synergies from the work of these organisations, Austria seeks to provide a platform to promote new ideas on how to address human security challenges. In May the first Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Cycle 2010 was held here, contributing to overcoming the deadlock in NPT. In December, we will host a conference to ban cluster munitions, a weapon that causes immense suffering among civilian populations. Today we have come together to promote the coming into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
At its adoption eleven years ago, after four decades of discussion, the CTBT was greeted with great enthusiasm, being labelled by President Clinton as the “longest sought and hardest fought prize in the history of arms control”. Referring to the signing of the Treaty, "The New Yorker" commented: "The signing has a fair claim to be the most momentous event ever to have taken place under the U.N.'s roof."
Fifty years after the horrifying images of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and after decades of living with the concept - if you can call it a concept - of "mutually assured destruction", the CTBT infused new hope to the international community. It held the promise to break the spiral of producing ever more sophisticated and more destructive nuclear war heads. After a total of 2165 nuclear test explosions, the CTBT would finally put an end, once and for all, to nuclear testing.
Eleven years later, 177 States have signed the Treaty and 140 have ratified it. While this would be a remarkable success for most Treaties, the CTBT has not yet entered into force. Ten of the countries listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty, the ratification of which is necessary for entry into force, have not yet completed their ratification process. Three of these ten states have yet to sign the Treaty.
It is thus fair to ask whether the CTBT held its promise. I believe two aspects are of primary importance in an attempt to answer this question:
- First, the CTBT has become a global treaty: It has gained an impressive number of signatures and ratifications, and the number of states parties is still growing, with 14 additional ratifications in the last two years. We have to keep up this momentum.
- And second, complete implementation of the Treaty is guaranteed by a worldwide verification system: This second point was proven most strikingly by the 2006 DPRK nuclear test. Although the CTBT’s International Monitoring System was not yet completed and the yield was very low, the DPRK event was well recorded. Twenty-two seismic stations, one as far away as South America, tracked the event.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
CTBT’s mandate clearly focuses the use of its monitoring network on detecting testing of nuclear weapons. However, a number of interesting ideas have been presented to make use of the network’s potential and to develop synergies with other instruments. CTBT’s monitoring stations could for example contribute crucial information to the monitoring of global climate change.
As a spin-off from the CTBT’s monitoring network, we could also benefit from early detection of and thus early warning on earthquakes and tsunamis. Together with SPIDER, the UN Platform for Space-based Information on Disaster Management and Emergency Response implemented by the UN Office for Outer Space here in Vienna, CTBT’s international monitoring system could thus make an important contribution to reducing the human toll of natural disasters.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Having proved efficient in securing that no nuclear test explosion will ever again go undetected, the CTBT today constitutes a key element in the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. It thus complements the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Together, they form the pillars of the United Nations nuclear non-proliferation system.
Let us not mince words: There is today a lack of confidence in the multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament tools and system. We must re-create a political vision and a practical, global partnership to generate new interest and confidence in multilateral arms control.
This morning, at the IAEA General Conference, I outlined a proposal for such a partnership which I had first presented at the NPT-Preparatory Committee in Vienna earlier this year. I proposed to learn from the founding instruments of the European Union and to multilateralize sensitive nuclear technology in order to build trust and confidence.
Similarly, we must work on building trust and confidence in the CTBT. This will also require new ideas, the readiness to overcome longstanding positions and openness for active international partnership.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
In preparing this conference, we have discussed at length on possible measures how to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the CTBT. Bruno will now present our ideas in more detail. Let me just say that it depends on each and every one of us to contribute to this process.
Concrete measures should support our advocacy efforts. In this context, Austria has offered to finance a CTBTO PrepCom Workshop for the countries of the Caribbean region, in Nassau, Bahamas, at the end of November this year. The workshop will aim at promoting signature and ratification of the CTBT, among others through an exchange of information among all countries of the Caribbean region and by facilitating implementation of concrete measures. We hope that it will thus complement efforts of this Article XIV Conference in a very practical way.
[Part 2 – H.E. Mr. Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Costa Rica]
Mr. Director-General,
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Colleagues,
The Treaty itself sufficiently defines purpose and mandate of this Article XIV Conference: It shall consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of this Treaty. At the same time, it intends to enhance the understanding of universal ownership of the CTBT and to stimulate efforts by all members of the Treaty to help create a more favourable climate and conditions more conducive to the early entry into force of the CTBT.
Participants of this Conference might wish to consider and to discuss how others, especially the ten Annex 2 States as the main addressees of our considerations could be supported in their efforts to appreciate the merits of multilateralism in arms control and, specifically, of early entry into force of the CTBT.
We have identified a number of good arguments at our disposal and we would just like to propose a few:
1. As an important non-proliferation instrument the CTBT constrains the development and qualitative improvement of new and more advanced nuclear weapons; it severely constrains the capacity of non nuclear weapons states to develop new nuclear weapons and it prevents the proliferation of materials, technologies and knowledge that can be used for nuclear weapons.
2. Ratification will strengthen the CTBT regime and tighten the still-open door.
3. The CTBT not only contributes to international, regional and national peace and security, it also helps prevent further devastation of human health and the global environment.
4. The comprehensive ban on testing is not discriminatory, it treats all Members equally, and data and other products are provided to all Member States with the same quality and speed.
5. The CTBT has been fulfilling its core objective and no CTBT ratifying State has enacted a nuclear test explosion (the same applies to the NPT as no NPT Member State has developed military nuclear capacities).
6. The global CTBT verification regime has proven itself efficient, capable to detect non-compliance with the Treaty and therefore can be regarded as a reliable deterrent.
7. Data collected by the 321 technical stations of the IMS will offer each Member State full benefits while each Member State will only contribute to the financing of its assessed percentage.
8. Concrete or possible threats caused by nuclear proliferation can only be resolved in a sustained way by also addressing underlying issues of the multilateral treaty-based security system.
9. In the possible grey zone which makes it difficult to distinguish with certainty between a peaceful nuclear program and a military program the CTBT provides a firm barrier between these two. Concretely, this would imply that for any CTBT Member it would be next to impossible to turn a peaceful nuclear program into effective nuclear weapons since the CTBT would rule out testing of those nuclear devices.
10. Finally, entry into force of the CTBT would greatly reduce the climate of distrust and discontent which has been penetrating the field of disarmament, which distorts all discussions and which makes it even more difficult to address some of today’s key challenges posed by the threats of nuclear proliferation.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Pursuing these good arguments should not be equalized with patronizing of those to be won over. It would rather be a matter of advocacy in the way of clarifying problems, offering additional information, raising consciousness and providing guidance in identifying one’s own particular interests. In fact it would be along the traditional pillars of the work of the United Nations, namely advocacy and assistance.
We would also highlight support for other measures, such as the extension of the appointment of the Special Representative, Ambassador Ramaker, who we commend for his work in the past and who we pledge to support as coordinators for the period until the next Conference, another one of the measures.
Support of technical assistance for the ratification process and for implementation measures by the Secretariat, as well as maintaining of a contact point for the exchange and dissemination of relevant information and documentation should be recommended to the Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS). Cooperation with non-governmental organizations, parliamentarians and their international associations, opinion leaders and the media might help raise awareness for the Treaty and its objectives, including the need for its early entry into force.
A measure of particular importance is to encourage and assist all States Signatories to cooperate fully in the establishment of the verification system in a timely and efficient manner. That will contribute to make the Treaty and its regime even more efficient and to strengthen confidence in the CTBT as an indispensable pillar in the global efforts to control nuclear non-proliferation.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Colleagues,
Finally, we would like to address the question of viability of the task of this Conference. Do we see any realistic chance for success of our efforts? Are we not preaching to the converted while those who are relevant for the advancement of the ratification process remain unchanged and unmoved?
First, there has always been some progress, though sometimes the pace might seem slow. Since the last Article XIV Conference, two years ago, 14 additional States have ratified the CTBT, including one Annex 2 State, Vietnam.
Second, none of the remaining ten Annex 2 States has voiced any objection in principle against ratification. Chinese officials have confirmed support for the CTBT while deliberations over its ratification were ongoing; Colombia, while claiming support for the CTBT, needs to resolve a well-known legal issue before ratification; the ratification by some is linked to regional considerations; India has pledged not to delay entry into force and Pakistan would follow. None of the obstacles that delay ratification in the remaining countries seem unsurmountable. The key to accelerate the process of ratification remains in the leadership role the United States would be ready to assume.
Therefore, and this is our third point, we are carefully watching developments in the United States. The great optimism for early ratification at the end of the nineties has given way to a new assessment of the nuclear posture. We very much hope that this process will lead to a national consensus against future nuclear test explosions. A huge majority of Americans seems to regard the CTBT as a desirable and necessary security step. The world will need the cooperation and leadership of the US to secure success of global efforts against nuclear proliferation and for increased security through efficient and structured disarmament.
The editorial of 4 January 2007 in the Wall Street Journal by Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn augurs well for a new dynamic in strategic thinking. We should not underestimate their assessment of one of the priorities for US security, stating that "Initiating a bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other key states."
This kind of renewed support for the goals that we all share would not relieve us of our task as mandated by this Conference. But it would give a new sense and hope to our efforts that we need to redouble in order to succeed facilitating the early entry into force of the CTBT.
We are looking forward to sharing the Presidency of this important Conference and we would wish all of us rewarding discussions. As for the outcome of this Conference, we would want to remind you that its success would prove itself in the result that no further Article XIV Conferences would be required.
Thank you.
